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a b s t r a c t
As of 2003, 15 hydrogen refuelling stations (HRSs) have been deployed in the Netherlands.
To become established, the HRS has to go through a permitting procedure. An important
document of the permitting dossier is the quantitative risk assessment (QRA) as it assesses
the risks of the HRS associated to people and buildings in the vicinity of the HRS. In the
Netherlands, a generic prescribed approach exists on how to perform a QRA, however
specific guidelines for HRSs do not exist. An intercomparison among the QRAs of permitted
HRSs has revealed significant inconsistencies on various aspects of the QRA: namely the
inclusion of HRS sub-systems and components, the HRS sub-system and component
considerations as predefined components, the application of failure scenarios, the deter-
mination of failure frequencies, the application of input parameters, the consideration of
preventive and mitigation measures as well as information provided regarding the HRS
surroundings and the societal risk. It is therefore recommended to develop specific QRA
guidelines for HRSs.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Hydrogen Energy Publications
LLC. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).
Introduction
The number of hydrogen refuelling stations (HRSs) in Europe
is steadily growing. In 2016, 106 HRSs were operational in
Europe, out of which four are situated in the Netherlands [1].
In total, 15 HRSs were inaugurated between 2003 and 2016 in
the Netherlands, whereas 11 HRSs ceased operation in that
period. The evolution of operational HRSs in the Netherlands
is shown in Fig. 1.
According to Dutch law [2e4], HRSs have to go through a
permitting process to become established. One of the main
aims of the permit is to limit the risk to people and the envi-
ronment associated to storing, dispensing and, possibly,
generating hydrogen at the HRS. Permits are provided by
permitting authorities, typically themunicipality in which the
HRSwill be located. Guidelines for the permitting of HRSs exist
for these authorities as of 2010 through NPR 8099:2010 [5]
which provides practical guidance for the design, installa-
tion, management and maintenance of HRSs and its
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successor, PGS35:2015 [6], which contains all provisions of
relevant laws related to HRSs and as such provides a reference
to permitting authorities to determine to which safety related
rules and conditions these HRSs have to comply. The appli-
cant of the permit, typically the owner or operator of the HRS,
has to submit a permitting dossier to the permitting authority.
This dossier consists of documents related to the HRS itself
and to the environment in which it will be built. The quanti-
tative risk assessment (QRA) is an important document of that
dossier as it assesses the risks of the HRS associated to people
and buildings in the vicinity of the HRS. Although at present
no regulatory necessity exists to provide a QRA for HRSswith a
storage capacity below 5000 kg, it has become good practice
for permitting authorities to request a QRA as part of the
permitting dossier to allow an assessment of the safety risks
associated to establishing and operating HRSs. In ISO/TS
19880-1 [7], a generic methodology for the quantitative risk
assessment of HRSs is provided. It recommends also that risk
assessments for HRSs should be (semi-) quantitative. In the
Netherlands, prescribed guidelines, which are in line with the
methodology proposed in ISO/TS 19980-1, exist on how to
generically perform a QRA but specific QRA guidelines for
HRSs do not yet exist.
An HRS consists of various interconnected sub-systems
and protection mechanisms, so the development and
assessment of a QRA can be a complex matter especially as
there is little experience due to limited deployment of HRSs in
the Netherlands. Therefore, permitting authorities may face
difficulties in assessing these QRAs without specific guidance.
In order to provide permitting authorities with specific QRA
guidance for HRSs, this paper assesses the QRAs of the ma-
jority of HRSs established in the Netherlands and based on
that analysis provides:
 permitting authorities with technical background on HRSs
in relation to the QRA
 lessons learned on how QRAs are performed
 recommendations on how QRAs can be improved
 support to national authorities in developing specific QRA
guidelines for HRSs
Additionally, an intercomparison of QRAs of permitted and
established HRSs provides a new dimension to the research
performed on risk assessments for HRSs. Literature has so far
focused on the application of risk assessment methodologies,
using quantitative [8e14] and non-quantitative approaches
[15e21], for HRSs in other countries than the Netherlands (like
China [10,11], Japan [16] and South Korea [17,18]) as well as the
comparison thereof [22e30] and the improvement of models
and tools [27,31e34], and data inputs [35e37] that are used in
the risk assessment of HRSs. QRA literature can thus be
divided in three main areas. Firstly, the application of
different risk assessment methodologies for HRSs contributes
to the improved understanding of the risks associated with
operating HRSs and the reflection towards the development of
failure scenarios (and failure frequencies) for specific HRS
configurations and designs. The aim is typically to improve
the system design of the HRS in order to increase the level of
safety associated to the HRS. However, QRAs used for the
permitting of HRSs are primarily oriented towards informing
permitting authorities about consequences of establishing the
HRS for its surrounding environment. Secondly, countries and
jurisdictions were HRS are sited have different approaches
towards the application of risk assessment methodologies.
Intra-jurisdiction comparisons therefore provide deeper in-
sights into the coherence of governing methodologies,
whereas inter-jurisdiction comparisons provide a wider
perspective on the impact of applying different methodolo-
gies. Permitting authorities are typically concerned about the
coherence to their governing methodology. Thirdly, im-
provements of software models and tools to realistically
simulate hydrogen releases as well as the quality of (hydrogen
specific) data are beneficial for all types of risk assessments,
but need to take stock of the influx of relevant research out-
comes. Recent developments, for example the development of
the HyRAM tool [31], shows that this is an evolving area,
Fig. 1 e Evolution of HRS deployment in the Netherlands.
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however, QRA developers may not have the flexibility to
deviate from mandated software packages. This paper is
contributing to expanding the literature in the second area,
especially since an intra-jurisdiction comparison of QRAs for
permitted HRSs has so far not been performed.
In the Netherlands, a prescribed risk assessment approach
exists on how to generically perform a QRA [38], how to
consider effects of releases of hazardous substances [39e47],
how to consider probabilities [48], how to consider sub-
systems and components in terms of release scenarios and
failure frequencies [49e51] as well as which software package
should be used [51]. This approach is thus also mandatory for
HRSs. A QRA that has followed the above mentioned pre-
scribed approach was performed by RIVM, an agency of a
Dutch Ministry and the main developer of the prescribed na-
tional risk assessment approach, for a virtual HRS in the
Netherlands [52]. However, for a real HRS going through a
permitting process, the QRA is performed by a vendor that
applies the generic prescribed methodology for the HRS. As
such, this paper also provides fundamental insights into how
the applicants interpret and apply the generic prescribed QRA
approach to HRSs. This provides permitting authorities feed-
back on areas in which inconsistencies or deviations from the
prescribed approach are observed.
This paper has applied the following methodology. The
intercomparison of QRAs on permitted HRSs is based on
assessment criteria that are common to all permitting au-
thorities. The QRA report includes six mandatory sections
[50], including a detailed map in which the HRS is to be
located within its surroundings, a description of the sur-
rounding (population density, neighbouring activities and
possible dangers coming from it, possible ignition sources),
a general description of the HRS, the risk assessment of the
sub-systems and components (scenarios, frequencies, as-
sumptions), the results of the risk assessment showing the
individual and societal risk and a detailed description of the
scenarios. The key sections of the QRA report that are
relevant for comparison and directly concern the HRS are
Fig. 2 e Overview of permitted HRSs in the Netherlands [53].
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the risk assessment of the sub-systems and components of
the HRS and the detailed description of scenarios, and, to a
lesser extent, the general description of the HRS. Chapter 3
and 4 provides the necessary background information to
enable the intercomparison in chapter 5. Chapter 2 in-
troduces the HRSs that were/are established in the
Netherlands and provides a historical perspective including
the reasoning of establishment and the applications that it
served. Chapter 3 introduces for all established HRSs in the
Netherlands, its technical specifications, the sub-systems
and components and the configurations. The identified
sub-systems and components are assessed from a QRA
perspective in Chapter 4 following the prescribed QRA
approach in the Netherlands in terms of considered failure
scenarios and frequencies. Relevant parameters and typical
values belonging to the HRS sub-systems and components
that are considered as inputs to the QRA are introduced in
this chapter as well. This provides the comparative frame-
work against which these key sections in the QRA reports of
the established HRSs in the Netherlands are compared
upon. Chapter 5 shows the results of the intercomparison
for all sections of the QRA, but with an emphasis on key
sections. On the basis of this intercomparison, recommen-
dations are provided for improvements.
The QRAs were obtained through visits and requests to
municipalities in which the HRSs were/are sited. Themajority
of the dossiers were obtained and only few could not be
retrieved due to expiration of archive dates or inability to track
dossiers related to the HRSs. The QRA reports have been
compared and assessed in a similar manner as permitting
authorities (or the experts of regional safety expertise centres)
do. The results are presented as much as possible
anonymously.
Historical overview of HRS deployment in the
Netherlands
In this chapter, the Dutch HRSs are introduced in a historical
perspective in order to provide background information on the
timing and reasoning of the establishment of HRSs in the
Netherlands. Between 2003 and 2016, 15 HRSs have been
realised in the Netherlands. The locations and operational
status in 2016 of these HRSs are shown in Fig. 2.
The first HRS in the Netherlands was inaugurated at the
bus depot of the public transport operator in Amsterdam in
2003 as part of the Clean Urban Transport for Europe project.
This project was among the first European projects to
demonstrate first generation hydrogen buses and refuelling
infrastructure in ten European cities. A follow-up project was
initiated in 2006 to enable a prolonged deployment of these
buses. In these projects, three buses of Mercedes were
deployed. An additional two hydrogen buses of APTS/VDL
were deployed as of 2011. To facilitate a two months demon-
stration project of a bus of Van Hool in Delft in fall 2008, an
HRS was established at the premises of bus operator Con-
nexxion. Inaugurated in 2006 and dismantled in 2011, the
Energy Research Centre (ECN) operated anHRS on its premises
in Petten to facilitate a field trial of a delivery vehicle for
transporting small goods at the site. The demonstration of a
canal cruise boat in Amsterdam has resulted in three HRSs,
one at the commissioning site in Meppel and two in Amster-
dam. The first publically accessible HRS in the Netherlands
was inaugurated in 2010 in Arnhem and was integrated in an
existing refuelling forecourt supplying traditional trans-
portation fuels. This HRS served a bus of HyMove and two
demonstration cars. The HyMove bus also refuelled at the HRS
Fig. 3 e Overview of HRS configurations in the Netherlands.
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in Apeldoorn in 2011 at the premises of the certification
institute KIWA. During the commissioning of the buses from
APTS/VDL, that were operated in Amsterdam, in Helmond in
2011, an HRS was used for testing these buses. In 2010, an HRS
was operated during a six weeks field trail of a baggage tow
truck at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport. A similar HRS is oper-
ated as of 2013 by WaterstofNet in Kamperland to facilitate
leisure boats. As of 2013, WaterstofNet also operates the first
700 bar HRS in the Netherlands and serves a second genera-
tion bus of APTS, a hydrogenwaste collection truck of E-trucks
and fuel cell cars. The first publicly accessible 700 bar HRS is in
operation as of 2013 and is located in Rhoon and fuels cars and
buses. In 2014, an HRS was erected at the premises of Linde in
Schiedam to refuel a car. In 2015, an HRS was established in
Hoogezand at the Holthausen premises to fuel a car and bus.
The current hydrogen refuelling infrastructure is expected
to be expanded in 2017 with HRSs in Den Haag, Arnhem and
Breda [54]. In Oude Tonge, a permit is given to build an HRS as
part of a multi-fuel station. Other HRS locations are being
considered as well [54].
Sub-systems and configurations of HRSs in the
Netherlands
In this chapter, the HRS configurations and sub-systems and
its technical specifications are provided to introduce relevant
parameters to beused subsequently for the intercomparisonof
the QRAs of the HRSs. Fig. 3 provides an overview of HRS sub-
systems and configurations and Table 1 gives an overview of
the technical specifications of these sub-systems of the HRSs.
An HRS is a system of interconnected sub-systems
that combined determine the configuration of the HRS.
A sub-system consists of (main) components and auxiliaries.
The main sub-systems of an HRS are: an on-site hydrogen
generator (either an electrolyser (converting water to
hydrogen by using electricity), or a reformer (converting nat-
ural gas to hydrogen by using steam)) or a hydrogen supply
system (either a hydrogen pipeline or a tube/cylinder trailer), a
compressor and/or booster (to increase pressure), a buffer
storage (to store hydrogen), a pre-cooler (to cool hydrogen to
enable fast-filling) and a dispenser (to transfer hydrogen to the
applications). A more detailed description of these sub-
systems is provided in chapter 4. A simple HRS configuration
is manually operated by applying a cascade refuelling strategy
(consecutively opening and closing of bundle valves) and
consists of few of the aforementioned sub-systems, typically a
trucked-in transportable buffer storage (typically multiple-
element gas containers), dispenser components (nozzle,
hose, break-away, pressure gauges) and simple auxiliaries
(piping, valves, etc.). These simple HRS configurations benefit
from low capital costs but have high operational costs (espe-
cially costs for hydrogen and transportation and rental of the
bundles) as a drawback. These HRSs allow hydrogen demon-
stration projects to kick-start without the need to invest in
capital intensive infrastructure. Eight HRSs in the Netherlands
Table 1 e Technical specifications of HRSs in the Netherlands.
HRS# 1 2 3 4 5 6
Location Helmond Rhoon Amsterdam Arnhem Delft Apeldoorn
Name Helmond-1 Rhoon Amsterdam-1 Arnhem Delft Apeldoorn
Operator WaterstofNet Air Liquide GVB Amsterdam VeBe
Van
Steijn
Connexxion KIWA
Supplier Ballast Nedam Air Liquide Linde HyGear Air Liquide KIWA
Opened in 2013 2014 2003 2010 2008 2011
Active (status
end 2016)
Yes Yes No (closed 2015) No (closed 2012) No (closed 2008) No (closed 2015)
Configuration style Complex Complex Complex Complex Complex Complex
Accessibility Semi-public Public Restricted Public Restricted Restricted
Multi fuel station No, only H2 No, only H2 No, only H2 Yes, H2
retrofitted
No, only H2 No, only H2
Dispensed H2 Gaseous Gaseous Gaseous Gaseous Gaseous Gaseous
Service pressure (bar) 350/700 350/700 350 350 350 350
Refuelling strategy Automated
cascade
Booster assisted
automated cascade
Booster assisted
automated single
bank overflow
Automated
cascade
Booster assisted
semi-automated
cascade (slow fill)
Booster assisted
manual single
bank overflow
H2 supply Electrolysis Pipeline Electrolysis SMR þ Delivered Delivered Delivered
Production capacity
(kg/h)
2,7 e 5,4 0,5 e e
Storage volume (L) 2655 2800 10250 2640 25410 9600
Storage pressure (bar) 450, 950 450, 950 300,438 200,420 200,350 200
Compressor (#) Yes (2) Yes (2) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1)
Pre-cooling Yes (up to 40 C) Yes (up to 40 C) No No No No
Nozzles (#) 2 3 1 1 1 1
Refuelled vehicles Cars, buses,
garbage truck
Cars, buses Buses Bus, delivery
truck, cars
Bus Bus
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have/had such a configuration: Petten, Meppel, Haarlemmer-
meer, Amsterdam-2, Helmond-2, Amsterdam-3, Kamperland
and Schiedam (stations 8 to 15 in Fig. 3 and Table 1).
A complex HRS configuration is automatedly operated and
consists, besides the buffer storage and the dispenser, of
additional sub-systems, such as an on-site hydrogen gener-
ator, a compressor/booster and/or a pre-cooler. Seven HRSs in
the Netherlands have/had such a configuration: Helmond-1,
Rhoon, Amsterdam-1, Arnhem, Delft, Apeldoorn and Hooge-
zand (stations 1 to 7 in Fig. 3 and Table 1). The HRS in Helmond
applies an automated cascade refuelling strategy inwhich two
compressors fill the medium and high pressure buffer storage
repetitively. Hydrogen is produced via on-site electrolysis and
delivered via pre-coolers to two dispensers. The HRS in Rhoon
applies a booster assisted cascade refuelling strategy for both
the 350 and 700 bar refuelling line, in which an automated
cascade refuelling strategy is applied and when necessary is
assisted by a booster (e.g. to complete a filling or to facilitate
back-to-back refuelling). The hydrogen is supplied by a
hydrogen pipeline and delivered pre-cooled to three dis-
pensers. The HRS in Amsterdam applied a booster refuelling
strategy in which the buffer storage was used to equalise the
pressure with the application and then used the booster to
complete refuelling. The hydrogen was produced on-site
through electrolysis and supplied to one dispenser. The sta-
tion in Arnhemused a cascade refuelling strategy inwhich the
compressor was used to fill two medium pressure buffer
storages. The hydrogen was produced via on-site natural gas
reforming and supplied to one dispenser. The HRS in Delft
made use of a hydrogen tube trailer and a medium pressure
buffer storage that both are used to equalise the pressure with
the application. After pressure equalisation, a booster was
used to complete the refuelling (in slow-fill mode) via one
dispenser. After the fill, the compressor was used to replenish
the partially depleted medium pressure buffer storage from
the tube trailer. The HRS in Apeldoorn used a large buffer
storage to apply a manual single bank overflow principle after
which, when approaching pressure equalisation, a booster
was used to complete the filling through one dispenser. The
HRS in Hoogezand applies a slow-fill booster refuelling strat-
egy in which a transportable buffer storage is used to supply
hydrogen through either the 350 bar or the 700 bar dispenser.
HRS sub-system and component assessment
from a QRA perspective
In this chapter, the HRS sub-systems and configurations
identified in Chapter 3 are assessed from a QRA perspective.
The sub-systems are assessed on 1) technical parameters
including operating pressure, hydrogen mass within compo-
nent boundaries and hydrogen throughput of the component
as input parameters for the QRA and 2) sub-system failure
scenarios in terms of hydrogen release scenarios and failure
frequencies based on the prescribed QRA approach in the
Netherlands [50]. This assessment provides the comparative
framework for the QRA intercomparison in Chapter 5.
In the Netherlands, a prescribed approach exists on how to
perform a QRA [38], how to consider effects of releases of
hazardous substances [39e47], how to consider probabilities
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Hoogezand Petten Meppel Haarlemmermeer Amsterdam Helmond Kamperland Amsterdam Schiedam
Hoogezand Petten Meppel Haarlemmermeer Amsterdam-2 Helmond-2 Kamperland Amsterdam-3 Schiedam
Holthausen ECN Maritima
Green
Technology BV
Schiphol Rederij Lovers APTS/VDL WaterstofNet Rederij Lovers Linde
Holthausen Air Products Linde Linde Linde Air Products Ballast
Nedam
Linde Linde
2015 2006 2010 2010 2011 2011 2013 2013 2014
Yes No (closed 2011) No
(closed 2010)
No (closed 2010) No (closed 2012) No
(closed 2011)
Yes No
(closed 2015)
No
(closed 2015)
Complex Simple Simple Simple Simple Simple Simple Simple Simple
Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted Semi-public Restricted Semi-public Semi-public Restricted
No, only H2 No, only H2 No, only H2 No, only H2 No, only H2 No, only H2 No, only H2 No, only H2 No, only H2
Gaseous Gaseous Gaseous Gaseous Gaseous Gaseous Gaseous Gaseous Gaseous
350/700 200 300 300 300 200 200 300 300
Booster assisted
manual single
bank overflow
(slow fill)
Manual
cascade
Manual
cascade
Manual cascade Manual cascade Manual
cascade
Manual
cascade
Manual
cascade
Manual
cascade
Delivered Delivered Delivered Delivered Delivered Delivered Delivered Delivered Delivered
e e e e e e e e e
? 1600 2400 2400 2400 3000 2400 2400 3200
300 200 300 300 300 200 200 300 300
Yes (1) No No No No No No No No
No No No No No No No No No
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bus, car Delivery
vehicle
Boat Baggage
tow truck
Boat Buses Boats Boat Car
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[48], how to consider sub-systems and components in terms of
release scenarios and failure frequencies [49e51] as well as
which software package should be used [51]. The QRA results
in the evaluation of two risk metrics associated to the HRS:
individual risk and societal risk. The individual or local risk is
used as a measure to guarantee a basic level of protection of a
single person. It is used to investigate small accident scenarios
and is independent of the surrounding environment. This risk
is typically visualised by a 1E-6 risk zone around the source of
the hazard, expressed inmeters, within which a single person
continuously exposed to the hazard has a chance to become
seriously or fatally injured once in every 1million years due to
an incident. The societal risk is used as a measure to under-
stand the consequences of a catastrophic incident on a group
of people. The societal risk is expressed with a F(N)-graph
which shows the frequency that a group of people of
different sizes fall victim to a serious or fatal accident.
An HRS is a system of interconnected sub-systems
comprising (main) components and auxiliaries. As such, an
HRS is considered by its sub-systems and, occasionally, (main)
components in the QRA. HRS sub-systems and components
are assessed on the basis of the prescribed QRA approach for
predefined sub-systems and components [51]. These sub-
systems are common to many other systems than HRSs.
Failure scenarios and basic failure frequencies for predefined
sub-systems and components relevant to HRSs are provided
in the next sections as well as relevant sub-systems and
component parameters for the QRA, including contained
mass (relevant parameter for instantaneous release scenarios
[19]), mass throughput and operating pressure (relevant pa-
rameters for continuous releases and leaks scenarios [19]).
The sub-systems and components can be protected by pre-
ventive and mitigation measures (e.g. blocking systems)
which, when activated, limit the release of hydrogen from
sub-system and component failure. Thesemeasures also have
failure frequencies. It is important to note that the failure
frequencies of sub-systems, components and measures are
not based on operational data, due to the limited availability
thereof with hydrogen and are therefore considered as
generic. An overview of relevant QRA literature is provided
below the tables on how sub-systems or components have
been treated differently from the prescribed QRA approach in
the Netherlands. This literature does not include the QRAs of
the permitted HRSs in the Netherlands as these will be
compared in chapter 5.
On-site hydrogen production e natural gas reformer
A natural gas reformer produces hydrogen by catalytically
converting natural gas and steam and/or oxygen into a syn-
gas. A natural gas reformer is used as on-site hydrogen pro-
duction unit in one HRS in the Netherlands (Arnhem).
Although the production capacity (0.5 kg/h) is small, larger on-
site units exist (>13 kg/h) [55]. An on-site reformer is typically
containerised and automated. In fact, a reformer consists of
many components including a reactor vessel, desulphurisa-
tion vessel, purifier, off gas vessel, heat exchanger, internal
hydrogen storage vessel, natural gas compressor, external
hydrogen and nitrogen vessels/cylinders [56]. Hydrogen
reformate (mixture of H2, CO2 and CO) is found in nearly all
processing equipment which by itself is partially occupied by
sorbent or catalyst beds. Some of the aforementioned com-
ponents are considered as predefined components in the QRA,
but the reformer as a sub-system is not. The relevant sub-
system data for a reference reformer with a production ca-
pacity of 100 Nm3/h [56] is summarised in Table 2.
Reformers have been treated in QRA literature differently,
either as a single component or as a multi-component sub-
system.When considered as a single component, the reaction
vessel is representing the reformer as a whole [52] and the
accompanying failure scenarios for the QRA mentioned in
Table 2 are applied,whereas considered as amulti-component
sub-system, the failure scenarios that are considered for the
QRA are: a natural gas supply line leak, a natural gas line leak
between the compressor and reformer and a catastrophic
failure of the hydrogen line between purification unit and
hydrogen compressor [26] or small and medium sized holes
and full bore rupture of the desulphurisation vessel, heat
exchanger, reformer vessel, hydrogen purification system and
purge gas buffers [57]. It has been concluded by Ref. [26] that
producing hydrogen on-site by electrolysis presents a lower
risk than producing hydrogen on-site by steam methane
reforming, due to the complexity of the reformer and the
presence of natural gas and hydrogen in the reformer.
On-site hydrogen production e water electrolyser
A water electrolyser produces hydrogen by electrochemically
splitting water molecules into their constituents. A water elec-
trolyser isusedason-sitehydrogenproductionunit in twoHRSs
in the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Helmond). Like reformers,
electrolysers are containerised, automated and available in
different sizes. An electrolyser consists of many components
including electrolyser stacks, a purifier, a heat exchanger, gas/
liquid separators, internalhydrogenstoragevessel andexternal
nitrogen cylinders [58]. Although the majority of these compo-
nents are considered as predefined components in theQRA, the
electrolyser stack may be considered as the reactor vessel as
predefined component as it changes the chemical characteris-
tics of substances, however in practice it is not a vessel. The
relevant sub-system data for a reference electrolyser with a
production capacity of 60 Nm3/h is summarised in Table 3. The
volumes and mass are estimated based on [58].
Electrolysers have been treated in QRA literature, either
as a single component or as a multi-component sub-sys-
tem. When considered as a single component, the reaction
vessel as predefined component is used to represent the
electrolyser as a whole [52] and accompanying failure sce-
narios for the QRA as mentioned in Table 2 are applied,
whereas considered as a multi-component sub-system, the
failure scenarios that are considered for the QRA are: a
catastrophic failure of the hydrogen purification system and
the venting of the released hydrogen through the exhaust
fan [26]. Besides the conclusion provided in Section 4.1 by
Ref. [26] regarding electrolyser systems, Ref. [52] concludes
that when the electrolyser is considered as reaction vessel
only, it has no significant influence on the 1E-6 risk
contours.
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Hydrogen supply e hydrogen pipeline
The Netherlands has 237 km of underground hydrogen pipe-
line infrastructure (internal pipe diameter between 5 and
20 cm [59], operating pressure around 100 bar and flow rate
around 50 kg per second [60] [61]) that provides industrial end-
users in the Netherlands and Belgium with hydrogen pro-
duced by large steam methane reforming facilities in the
Rotterdam industrial area. One HRS in the Netherlands
(Rhoon) is directly connected to a branch of the hydrogen
pipeline infrastructure of Air Liquide and part of the pipeline
is considered to be inside the boundaries of the HRS. This
pipeline is connected aboveground to the HRS. An above-
ground and underground pipeline is considered as predefined
component in the QRA. The diameter and the length of the
pipeline within the boundaries of the HRS determine the
failure frequencies. In Table 4, the relevant component data is
provided. The failure frequencies are provided in the unit per
meter per year.
Hydrogen supply e tube/cylinder trailer
Hydrogen tube or cylinder trailers are used to distribute
hydrogen from production facilities to end-users and can also
be used by HRSs as a permanent storage in which the trailer is
being replaced when empty, as a temporary storage which is
used to fill up the stationary storage, or as a back-up storage
that can be called uponwhen the on-site hydrogen production
unit is out of operation, e.g. during maintenance. The total
amount of hydrogen stored in trailers is dependent on the
storage pressure (typically 200 or 300 bar) and amount of cyl-
inders or tubes on the trailer, but typically ranges between 350
and 550 kg (e.g. Ref. [62]). Tube trailers consist of multiple
pressurised tubes or cylinder (s)(bundles) that are connected
through a manifold and may have individual closing valves
per tube or cylinder bundle (section). The trailer is connected
to the HRS by a flexible unloading hose. The HRS in Delft used
the tube trailer as a permanent storage, whereas other HRSs
consider it as a back-up storage. The tube trailer sub-system
Table 3 e Electrolyser data.
On-site hydrogen production - electrolyser
Typical application data relevant for QRA
Mass throughput g/s 1.5 g/s H2 (60 Nm3/h)
Estimated mass contained in component kg 2 kg H2 (2.4 m3, 10 bar)
Operating pressure bar 10 bar
QRA considerations for the predefined sub-system and/or component, release scenarios and failure frequencies [50]
Predefined QRA sub-system/component e No, however considered as a system of predefined sub-components:
pressurised storage tank/gas cylinders (hydrogen, nitrogen), heat
exchanger (electrolyte), reactor vessel (electrolyser stacks) and process
vessel (purification system, gas/liquid separators).
Failure scenarios e Reactor vessel, process vessel (see section above).
Pressurised storage tank, heat exchanger (see sections below).
Failure frequencies
(respectively)
/yr Reactor vessel, process vessel (see section above).
Pressurised storage tank, heat exchanger (see sections below).
Table 2 e Reformer data.
On-site hydrogen production e reformer
Typical application data relevant for QRA
Mass throughput g/s 10 g/s NG, 2.5 g/s H2 (100 Nm3/h)
Estimated mass contained in component kg 0.4 kg H2 (0.9 m3, 5 bar) 1.1 kg NG (0.2 m3, 5 bar), 0.6 kg off-gas (0.9 m3,
0.5 bar, CO2 rich), 0.8 kg reformate (0.2 m3, 5 bar, H2 rich)
Operating pressure bar 5 bar
QRA considerations for the predefined sub-system and/or component, release scenarios and failure frequencies [50]
Predefined QRA sub-system or component e Not considered as sub-system but by predefined components:
compressor (natural gas and hydrogen), pressurised storage tank/gas
cylinders (hydrogen, off gas, nitrogen), heat exchanger (reformate),
reactor vessel (reformer) and process vessel (purification system,
desulphurisation system).
Failure scenarios for a reactor and process vessel e 1: Instantaneous release entire content;
2: Continuous release entire content in 10 min;
3: Continuous release through 10 mm hole (reactor vessel, process
vessel),
For the compressor, pressurised storage tank and heat exchanger, see
sections below.
Failure frequencies
(respective to the aforementioned failure scenarios)
/yr 1: 5E-6; 2: 5E-6; 3: 1E-4
For the compressor, pressurised storage tank and heat exchanger, see
sections below.
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can be considered as a combination of a predefined sub-
systems and a predefined component in the QRA, namely as
a road tanker with a pressurised tank and an unloading hose.
The failure frequency of the hose is dependent on the
unloading time or the time that it is pressurised connected.
The relevant sub-system and component data is summarised
in Table 5.
Tube trailers have been treated in the QRA literature with
different failure scenarios: catastrophic failure of a single
tube, a leak from tube trailer fittings (all content released) and
a full bore rupture of the flexible hose [10] and catastrophic
failure and leak during unloading [26].
Hydrogen compressor/booster
Pressure elevation up to 1000 bar in an HRS is obtained by
using a hydrogen compressor and/or booster. A compressor is
not involved in the refuelling process itself and is located
upstream of the buffer storage, whereas a booster is involved
in the refuelling process and is located downstream of the
buffer storage. Boosters have therefore higher capacities than
compressors, but both have integrated heat exchangers for
thermal management. The compressor/booster is used in
seven HRSs in the Netherlands: a compressor is used in two
HRSs (Helmond, Arnhem), a compressor that is also used as a
booster in three HRSs (Rhoon, Amsterdam, Delft) and a
booster is used in two HRSs (Apeldoorn, Hoogezand (slow-
fill)). Compressors/boosters are considered as a predefined
sub-system in the QRA, however only for reciprocating com-
pressors. Besides these piston compressors, other positive
displacement compressor types are being used in HRSs (e.g.
ionic liquids, membrane/diaphragm). The relevant sub-
system data for a reference compressor (e.g. Ref. [63]) is
summarised in Table 6.
Table 4 e Pipeline data.
Hydrogen supply e pipeline
Typical application data relevant for QRA
Mass throughput g/s 50000 g/s H2
Estimated mass contained in components kg 2 kg (for 25 m of pipe (15 cm diameter))
Operating pressure bar 100 bar
QRA considerations for the predefined sub-system and/or component, release scenarios and failure frequencies [50]
Predefined QRA sub-system/component e Yes, aboveground or underground pipeline; nominal diameter of
aboveground pipe in three categories (d < 75 mm; 75 mm  d  150 mm;
d > 150 mm)
Failure scenarios e 1: Rupture;
2: Leak through a hole with an effective diameter of 10% of nominal
diameter.
Failure frequencies
(respectively)
/(m$yr) For an aboveground pipe:
Pipe with diameter < 75 mm, 1: 1E-6; 2: 5E-6;
Pipe with diameter  75 mm and diameter  150 mm, 1: 3E-7, 2: 2E-6;
Pipe with diameter > 150 mm, 1: 1E-7; 2: 5E-7.
For an underground pipe:
1: 5E-7; 2: 1.5E-6.
Table 5 e Trailer data.
Hydrogen supply e tube/cylinder trailer
Typical application data relevant for QRA
Mass throughput g/s 200 g/s H2
Estimated mass contained in component kg 350-550 kg (total), 1.5 kg (per cylinder), 15 kg (per tube), 75 kg (per cylinder
section)
Operating pressure bar 200/300 bar
QRA considerations for the predefined sub-system and/or component, release scenarios and failure frequencies [50]
Predefined QRA sub-system/component e Yes, road tanker with a pressurised tank and a unloading hose, but no
guidance on compartmentation of the tank of the road tanker
Failure scenarios e Road tanker:
1: Instantaneous release of entire content;
2: Release of entire content from the largest output connection located on
the side or bottom of the tank;
(A failure scenario for external impacts on the road tanker needs also
consideration when relevant).
Hose:
1: Rupture;
2: Leak through a hole with an effective diameter of 10% of nominal
diameter.
Failure frequencies
(respectively)
/yr
/h
Road tanker:: 1: 5E-7; 2: 5E-7
Hose: 1: 4E-6; 2: 4E-5
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Compressors have been treated in QRA literature with
different failure frequencies even though the standard
component considerations have been applied. The basic fail-
ure frequencies, that are taken from the ANIMAL database [64]
and the UK HSL database [65], for the catastrophic failure
scenario are 1.9E-2 by Ref. [52] and 6.5E-3 by Ref. [10] and for
the leak scenario is 5.9E-2 by Ref. [10].
Hydrogen buffer storage
The hydrogen buffer storage sub-system consists of one or
more sections of interconnected vessels or cylinders that can
either be permanently or temporary located in the HRS. All 15
HRSs have a buffer storage but the capacity and pressure level
differ significantly among the HRSs. The hydrogen storage
capacity ranges between 25 and 220 kg (between 1600 and
10250 L) at pressures between 200 and 950 bar (see Table 1). A
buffer storage sub-system can be considered as a predefined
sub-system in two ways: as aboveground pressurised storage
tank for volumes above or equal to 0.15 m3 or as a gas cylinder
for volumes smaller than 0.15 m3. The release scenarios for
these sub-systems are different (see Table 7) especially in view
of the compartmented arrangement of the storage tubes/cyl-
inders. For a gas cylinder bundle, the continuous release
scenario is considered through a 5 mm hole (3.3 mm for only
one cylinder) instead of a 10 mm hole for the aboveground
pressurised storage system. It is noted that for plastic tanks
the instantaneous release and fire scenario may need to be
considered differently [49].
Hydrogen pre-cooler/heat exchanger
To limit the temperature rise of hydrogen in the storage of the
application during refuelling and therefore to enable fast filling,
hydrogen should be pre-cooled. As this sub-system is located
before the dispenser, it has the same mass throughput and
pressures as the dispenser sub-system. Two HRSs have a pre-
cooler installed (Helmond, Rhoon). There are several cooling
concepts (e.g. co-axial tubes, shell and tubes, coldmetal blocks)
and cooling media available (e.g. brine, glycol, liquid nitrogen,
liquidhydrogen,CO2) [66]. Thepre-coolerwill need towithstand
high hydrogen pressures so coaxial tube evaporator configura-
tions, in which the coolant material is in the outer tube, are
more suited than brazed plate or plate and shell designs. The
designpressureof thecoolant tubes (co-axial design) is typically
lower than that of the high pressure hydrogen tube. The pre-
cooler/heat exchanger of the shell-and-tube type is then
considered as a predefined sub-system in the QRA. Another
cooling concept that can be applied in (typically highly utilised)
HRSs (but not in the Dutch HRSs yet) is a cooling block with
hydrogen and coolant tubes routed through separately [67]. It is
not clear if such a pre-cooler/heat exchanger type can be
consideredasapredefined sub-system in theQRA.The relevant
sub-system data is summarised in Table 8 (based on [66]).
Table 6 e Compressor/booster.
Hydrogen compressor/booster
Typical application data relevant for QRA
Mass throughput g/s 0e60 g/s
(compressor << booster)
Estimated mass contained in
component
kg 0.1e1 kg
Operating pressure bar 300 - 1000 bar outlet
pressure (different pressure
levels in compression stages)
QRA considerations for the predefined sub-system and/or
component, release scenarios and failure frequencies [50]
Predefined QRA sub-system/
component
e Yes, compressor,
but only guidance
on reciprocal compressors
Failure scenarios e 1: Catastrophic failure;
2: Leak (10% diameter).
Failure frequencies
(respectively)
/yr 1: 1E-4; 2: 4.4E-3
Table 7 e Buffer storage data.
Hydrogen buffer storage
Typical application data relevant for QRA
Mass throughput g/s 0e60 g/s
Estimated mass contained in component kg size dependent, NL HRSs: 25e220 kg
Operating pressure bar 200 - 950 bar
QRA considerations for the predefined sub-system and/or component, release scenarios and failure frequencies [50]
Predefined QRA sub-system/component e Yes, aboveground pressurised storage tank (>0.15 m3) or gas cylinder
(0.15 m3)
Failure scenarios e Aboveground pressurised storage tank:
1: Instantaneous release of entire contents;
2: Release of entire contents in 10min in a continuous and constant stream;
3: Continuous release of contents from a hole with an effective diameter of
10 mm
Gas cylinder bundle:
1: Instantaneous release of entire contents of one cylinder;
2: Continuous release of remaining contents from a hole with an effective
diameter of 5 mm;
3: Fire in the surroundings of the gas cylinder
Failure frequencies
(respectively; N ¼ number of cylinders
/yr Aboveground pressurised storage tank: 1: 5E-7; 2: 5E-7, 3: 1E-5
Gas cylinder bundle: 1: N*5E-7; 2: (N-1)*5E-7; 3: 1E-5
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Hydrogen dispenser
The hydrogen dispenser sub-system, which includes typically
components like a cabinet, metering device, piping, break-
away, hose, nozzle, pressure relief device, communication
interface etc. [7] may include one or several types of nozzles,
like a 350 bar normal flow nozzle (internal nozzle pipe
diameter ± 4 mm), a 350 bar high flow nozzle (internal nozzle
pipe diameter ± 8 mm) and/or a 700 bar normal flow nozzle
(internal nozzle pipe diameter ± 5 mm) [68]. The hose length
should not exceed 5 m [7]. All HRSs have dispensers, but the
nozzle type(s) differ per HRS. As required by ISO/TS 19880-
1:2016, the dispenser should terminate refuelling of light duty
vehicles if the fuel flow rate goes beyond 60 g/s or the
maximumoperating pressure rises above 125% of the nominal
working pressure (so 875 bar for an HRS with a service pres-
sure of 700 bar) [7]. The dispenser hose is considered as a
predefined component in the QRA. The scenarios are the same
as the unloading hose of the tube trailer (see Section 4.4). The
failure frequency of the hose is dependent on the unloading
time. The relevant sub-system data is summarised in Table 9.
Hydrogen process piping
Pipes that connect the different sub-systems of the HRS
together are considered as a predefined component in the
QRA. The QRA considerations are the same as for the pipeline
(see Table 4).
Preventive and mitigation measures
HRSs employ blocking components as preventive and miti-
gation measures (e.g. detection with automatic shut-off
valves) to minimise the hydrogen release from sub-system
or component failure. As these measures have a failure fre-
quency as well, this results in failure scenarios for continuous
releases with combined failure probabilities for the relevant
sub-systems and components. According to the PGS 35,
blocking components need to be applied between all sub-
systems [6]. Other preventive and mitigation measures that
can be applied are non-return valves and excess flow valves.
The failure frequency and the considered reaction time for
these measures are shown in Table 10.
In contrast to the reaction time considered for a predefined
blocking components in the QRA, according to the PGS35 [6],
the response time of an emergency shutdown device (ESD)
should not be greater than 5 s.
Intercomparison of QRAs of HRSs in the
Netherlands
In this chapter, the results of the intercomparisonof tenQRAsof
HRSs in the Netherlands, including 1 permitted but not yet
established HRS, are presented. The ten QRAs are developed by
Table 8 e Pre-cooler/heat exchanger.
Hydrogen pre-cooler/heat exchanger
Typical application data relevant for QRA
Mass throughput g/s 0e60 g/s
Estimated mass
contained in
component
kg 0.1e0.5 kg
Operating pressure bar final target refuelling pressure; 
875 bar
QRA considerations for the predefined sub-system and/or
component, release scenarios and failure frequencies [50]
Predefined QRA
sub-system/
component
e Yes, heat exchanger, but only for
shell-and-tube designs
Failure scenarios e Pipe heat exchanger with casing design
pressure greater than gas pressure:
1: Rupture of 10 pipes
simultaneously
Pipe heat exchanger with casing design
pressure less than or equal to gas
pressure:
1: Rupture of 10 pipes
simultaneously;
2: Rupture of 1 pipe;
3: Leak with an effective diameter of
10% of the nominal diameter of one
pipe.
Failure frequencies
(respectively)
/yr Pipe heat exchanger with casing design
pressure greater than gas pressure:
1: 1E-6
Pipe heat exchanger with casing design
pressure less than or equal to gas
pressure: 1: 1E-5; 2: 1E-3; 3: 1E-2
Table 9 e Unloading hose.
Hydrogen dispenser
Typical application data relevant for QRA
Mass throughput g/s 0e60 g/s
Estimated mass
contained in component
kg 0e0.05 kg (10 m
(hose and internal piping),
d ¼ 5 mm)
Operating pressure bar final target refuelling
pressure;  875 bar
QRA considerations for the predefined sub-system and/or
component, release scenarios and failure frequencies [50]
Predefined QRA
sub-system/component
e Yes, loading/unloading hose
Failure scenarios e 1: Rupture;
2: Leak with an effective
diameter of 10% of nominal
diameter
Failure frequencies
(respectively)
/h 1: 4E-6; 2: 4E-5
Table 10 e Preventive and mitigation measures.
Preventive and mitigation measures [50]
QRA considerations for blocking components
Failure frequency 1E-3
Reaction time s 120
QRA considerations for excess flow valves
Failure frequency 1.2E-1 (outflow is  1.2  set value);
6E-2 (outflow is > 1.2  set value)
Reaction time s 5
QRA considerations for non-return valves
Failure frequency 6E-2
Reaction time s 5
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sevendifferent vendors. TheQRAreport includessixmandatory
sections [50], including a detailedmap inwhich the HRS is to be
located within its surroundings, a description of the surround-
ing (population density, neighbouring activities and possible
dangers coming from it, possible ignition sources), a general
description of the HRS, the risk assessment of the sub-systems
and components (scenarios, frequencies, assumptions), a
detailed description of the scenarios and the results of the risk
assessment showing the individual and societal risk. The
intercomparison addresses all sections, but focussesmainly on
the key sections in the QRA that directly concern the HRS and
the riskassessment.Therefore,paragraph5.2 isdedicated to the
risk assessment of the HRS sub-systems and components (sce-
narios, frequencies, assumptions) and the detailed description
of the scenarios. The reference framework to which the HRS
sub-systems and components and the scenario description are
qualitatively compared to is provided in chapter 4.
Intercomparison results for complementary QRA sections
The complementary sections of the QRA are the detailedmap,
a description of the surrounding, the general description of
the HRS and the (visualisation of the) QRA results regarding
the individual and societal risk. The sections are important for
the QRA but receive less priority for the intercomparison as
these do not directly concern the risk assessment of the HRSs.
Although the detailed location map in which the HRS is to
be located is provided in all QRAs, the description of the HRS
surroundings is not always included. When it is included, in-
formation regarding the surrounding built environment and
its functionality, the description of the people present in its
surrounding, the surface roughness length and the weather
conditions considered is provided.
All QRAs provide a general description of the HRS, but the
level of detail varies. The description should be clear enough
to enable identification of all sub-systems, components and
accompanying technical parameters. Some sub-systems and
component descriptions contain too limited information to
understand why certain technology and scenario selections
have been made (e.g. for the heat exchanger and the
compressor). Some QRAs provide block diagrams, whereas
others provide process descriptions. In some occasions, a
description of the refuelling strategy is provided.
The provision of input parameters for the HRS sub-system
and component consideration varies among the QRAs. All
QRAs provide the operating pressure, however QRAs differ
with regards to the release duration (actual or considered) and
the mass/volume released (actual or maximum). The tem-
perature, release hole diameter and release flow are parame-
ters that are only occasionally provided.
The resultsof theriskassessmentshouldbepresented for the
individual and the societal risk. In all QRAs, the individual risk is
presentedaccording to therequirements,beingamapwith5risk
zones (1E-4, 1E-5, 1E-6, 1E-7 and1E-8) depictedon it. Not allQRAs
provide the mandatory F(N)-graph for the societal risk. The so-
cietal risk has also been presented as an area of influence and a
1% lethality zone on amap, or simply with a statement that the
societal risk isnegligiblewithoutproviding themeans toverify it.
The contribution of the individual failure scenarios to the indi-
vidual and societal risk is not systematically provided.
In conclusion, information regarding the HRS surround-
ings and the QRA results for the societal risk are occasionally
omitted whereas this is a mandatory reporting requirement.
The level of detail in the general description of the HRS varies
significantly among the QRAs with some insufficiently
detailed descriptions. Also the input parameters for HRS sub-
systems and components are not sufficiently reported as key
parameters are occasionally omitted and different in-
terpretations of parameter notations are observed. The
detailed map and the QRA results for the individual risk are
properly included in the QRAs.
Intercomparison results for key QRA sections: HRS sub-
systems and components and scenario descriptions
The HRS sub-systems and components are assessed in terms
of inclusion in the QRA, sub-system and component consid-
erations in general (system boundaries, selection of
Table 11 e Summary of inconsistencies in HRS sub-system/component considerations from the intercomparison of QRA
for permitted HRSs in the Netherlands.
HRS sub-system/component Inconsistencies observed
Sub-system/
component
excluded
from QRA
Unclarity
about
predefined
sub-system/
component
considerations
Inconsistency in
predefined
sub-system/
component
considerations
Inconsistency
in applying
failure
scenarios
Inconsistency
in applying
failure
frequencies
Reformer No Yes
Electrolyser Yes Yes
Pipeline No No No No No
Trailer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Compressor/booster Yes Yes No No No
Storage No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-cooler/heat exchanger Yes No No No No
Dispenser Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Process piping Yes No No No No
“Yes” indicates that at least on one occasion an inconsistency is observed.
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predefined subsystem and components), predefined sub-
system and component characteristics (input parameters),
failure scenarios and failure frequencies. If at least one
inconsistency is found among the QRAs, it is labelled as “yes”
in Table 11. An inconsistency is defined as a deviation from
the guidelines of the prescribed QRA approach. The results of
the intercomparison are summarised in Table 11 and per sub-
system/component further elaborated in Section 5.2.1e5.2.10.
On-site hydrogen production e natural gas reformer
One HRS in the Netherlands was equipped with a reformer. In
the relevant QRA it is stated that the reformer has been
included in the risk assessment, but that its contribution to
the individual risk zone is very small when compared to the
contribution of the hydrogen buffer storage. No further details
are provided on how the reformer is considered in the QRA, so
it is not possible to verify sub-system considerations, applied
failure scenarios and frequencies and subsequent results for
the risk zone. In Section 4.1, it is highlighted that reformers
have been considered differently in QRA literature (as a single
component or as a multi-component sub-system). It therefore
remains unclear how a reformer, as a multi-component sub-
system, should be considered in the QRA.
On-site hydrogen production e water electrolyser
Two HRSs in the Netherlands are/were equipped with an
electrolyser. In the relevant QRAs, the electrolyser has been
recognised as a sub-system of the HRS, but it has not been
included in the QRA. The reasoning provided for excluding the
electrolyser from the QRA is the limited amount of hydrogen
mass contained within the sub-system. In QRA literature
however (see Section 4.2), electrolysers have been considered
but in different ways. It is therefore remains unclear how an
electrolyser, as a multi-component sub-system, should be
considered in the QRA.
Hydrogen supply e hydrogen pipeline
One HRS has a connection to a hydrogen pipeline. In the
relevant QRA, the pipeline complies with the description and
considerations provided in Section 4.3.
Hydrogen supply e tube/cylinder trailer
The tube or cylinder trailer has been included in the relevant
QRAswhen it is considered as a permanent storage of theHRS.
In that case, the trailer is considered simultaneously as two
sub-systems: a hydrogen buffer storage sub-system with a
compartmented aboveground pressurised storage tank (no
time fraction applied on the failure frequency to indicate the
permanent allocation) and as a road tank with hose sub-
system comprising a road tanker with a pressurised tank
and a unloading hose (time fraction applied to the failure
frequency to indicate a non-continuous use). Consequently,
seven failure scenarios have been applied (see Section 4.4 and
4.6) in the relevant QRAs. However, the aboveground pres-
surised storage tank failure scenarios are considered to apply
for each tube, resulting in an adjustment of the failure fre-
quency by the number of tubes. This approach coincides with
the adjusted failure frequencies approach that is applied to
gas cylinder bundles. The time fraction applied to the failure
scenarios for the trailer hose is according to its actual usage.
Although in reality the trailer is equipped with blocking
components (see Section 4.10) that are usedwhen the trailer is
not operated, such blocking components are not considered in
the relevant QRAs. Incorporating blocking components to the
failure scenarios of the trailer would result in a reduction of
the amount of hydrogen released and an adjustment of failure
frequencies. However, the physical appearance of blocking
components explains why the trailer has been considered as
an aboveground storage tank when not being in operation.
Consequently however, applying this approach has resulted
in time fractions greater than 1 (appearance time and active
time) for similar failure scenarios (e.g. instantaneous failure
scenario) in some of the relevant QRAs, resulting in an over-
estimation of the risk.
When the trailer is considered as a back-up storage that
will only be called upon when the primary hydrogen produc-
tion or supply is not available, it is treated differently among
the relevant QRAs. In some QRAs, the back-up trailer is
excluded on the basis that it is not considered part of the HRS
configuration during normal operation. In some QRAs, the
trailer is included following the failure scenarios for a road
tanker (see Section 4.4). In that case, the total amount of
stored hydrogen in the trailer is considered to be released in
the instantaneous release scenario of the trailer. The failure
frequencies are adjusted by a time fraction which is in line
with the actual use of the trailer and the hose. The time
fractions applied are the same for the hose and the trailer.
Hoses are considered with and without blocking components.
In conclusion, hydrogen trailers have been considered
differently in the relevant QRAs in terms of sub-system/
component considerations, inclusion or exclusion (with moti-
vation) of back-up trailers, applied failure scenarios when
considering multiple pressurised tubes, applied failure fre-
quency (adjustments for time fraction of usage and number of
tubes as well as applying preventive and mitigation measures)
and input parameters (released mass inventory). These
different considerations are partially caused by the lack of
guidance for compartmented pressurised storage sub-systems.
Hydrogen compressor/booster
The HRSs with a complex configuration include a compressor
or booster but these sub-systems have not always been
included in the relevant QRAs. The argumentations used to
exclude the compressor from the QRA are that it is not
considered among the failure scenarios that have an impor-
tant contribution to the risk zone and that the hydrogenmass
within the sub-system boundaries is small. For the QRAs that
have included the compressor or booster, the technology type
is not mentioned in the description of the sub-system, leaving
it to assume that piston compressors are applied as this is the
predefined technology in the QRA. A remark is made in one of
the QRAs that it is not clear how to consider the compressor as
a predefined sub-system as the compressor consists of several
components, like compression tubes (or stages) with in-
between heat exchangers. Also, the operating parameters of
the compressor or booster (pipeline diameter, pressure, mass
released) are not systematically provided among the QRAs.
When the compressor/booster is included, the failure sce-
narios as described in Section 4.5 are applied and the rupture
and leak scenarios are considered on the incoming piping of
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the compressor/booster. In some QRAs, a time fraction is
applied to the failure frequencies when the compressor is not
operated continuously. When the operating time of the
compressor is not assessed, continuous operation is assumed.
No blocking components have been applied to the compressor
in the QRA.
In conclusion, hydrogen compressors have been consid-
ered differently in the relevant QRAs in terms of the inclusion
or exclusion (with motivation) and applied failure frequency
(adjustments for time fraction or not). In one of the QRAs, a
question is being raised about the sub-system boundaries of
the compressor.
Hydrogen buffer storage
All HRSs include a hydrogen buffer storage and all QRAs
include the buffer storage has as a sub-system. In themajority
of the QRAs, the volumetric differentiation between the
aboveground pressurised storage tank (0.15 m3) and gas
cylinder (<0.15 m3) is correctly applied. When this is not
correctly applied, it is done without explanation or it has been
argued that the permanent cylinder bundle possesses the
characteristics of the aboveground pressurised storage tank
because transportation and de-/coupling actions do not occur.
Compartmentation of the hydrogen buffer storage in bundles,
banks or sections has resulted in the selection of a different
set of failure scenarios. For gas cylinder bundles, the failure
scenarios presented in Section 4.6 are generally well applied.
Deviations have been observed by including an extra contin-
uous release scenario of the entire content from a holewith an
effective diameter of 3.3 mm (this hole size is relevant if the
storage sub-system consisted of only 1 cylinder) and by
adjusting failure frequencies for the continuous release sce-
nario, as in someQRAs the failure frequency is not adjusted by
the remaining number of cylinders (N-1), as it should be, but
by all cylinders (N). Also the amount of hydrogen that is
released differs among the QRAs. In some QRAs, it is assumed
that all content is released, even though the cylinder bundles
are physically and operationally separated from each other
and, according to the refuelling procedure, are never opened
at the same time. It is unclear how the QRA should consider
the existence of banks during operation, e.g. during cascade
refuelling. Also, for simple HRS configurations (see chapter 3),
it is conservatively assumed in the QRAs that the storage
buffer is always full even though refuelling takes place. Some
QRAs consider for the instantaneous and continuous release
scenario, besides the release of remaining hydrogen in the
storage buffer, also the subsequent supply of hydrogen from
neighbouring sub-systems. Blocking components are then
used to adjust the failure frequencies for the amount of
hydrogen that is released.
For compartmentedabovegroundpressurisedstorage tanks,
no QRA guidance exists in Ref. [50]. Several approaches have
been applied including A) applying the failure scenarios of the
aboveground pressurised storage tank and adjusting the failure
frequency for all scenarios by the number of aboveground
pressurised storage tanks, B) applying the failure scenarios of
the gas cylinder bundle to the aboveground pressurised storage
tanks, C) applying the instantaneous release scenario of the gas
cylinder bundle to a section of interconnected compartmented
aboveground pressurised storage tanks and, for the continuous
release scenarios, the releaseofhydrogencontained inonlyone
section. The failure scenario due to fire has only been consid-
ered applicable to the gas cylinder bundle and not to the
aboveground pressurised storage tank.
In conclusion, the hydrogen buffer storage sub-system has
been considered in different ways among the QRAs. It is not
clear how the compartmented aboveground pressurised tank
sub-system should be considered, which has resulted in a
variety of approaches being applied. Also for the gas cylinder
bundles, differences are observed in the application of failure
scenarios, the adjustment of failure frequencies for the
number of relevant affected cylinders and the consideration
of operationally independent storage sections consisting of
interconnected bundles. Also, it should be considered
whether the failure scenario due to fire should also be applied
as a failure scenario for the aboveground pressurised storage
tank.
Hydrogen pre-cooler/heat exchanger
Two HRSs in the Netherlands are equipped with a pre-cooler/
heat exchanger. The hydrogen pre-cooler has not always been
included in the relevant QRAs even when the HRS includes it
as a sub-system. When it is excluded, it is done without
providing any additional reasoning. When it is included, it is
considered as described in Section 4.7. Possible failure sce-
narios related to the coolant fluid are not considered to be part
of the QRA. Section 4.7 highlights that different pre-cooling
concepts exist and that it is not clear how these should be
considered if it deviates from the predefined technology.
Hydrogen dispenser
The hydrogen dispenser sub-system has not always been
included in the QRAs even though all HRSs include it as a sub-
system. When it is not included, there is no explanation pro-
vided why it is not included. When it is included, the failure
scenarios are applied per each hose in accordance with Sec-
tion 4.8. However, in one QRA, the dispenser has been
considered as an unloading arm instead of an unloading hose.
This is done without providing a justification for it. Although
the failure scenarios are the same, the failure frequencies for
the arm are approximately a factor 100 times less than the
failure frequencies for the hose, leading to a significant un-
derestimation of the associated risks (3E-08 vs 4E-06 per hour
for the rupture scenario and 3E-7 vs 4E-5 for the leak scenario).
In one QRA for a simple HRS configuration, the flexible piping
that connects the hydrogen storage buffers to the central
hydrogen collection tube is considered as a hose. The calcu-
lation of the number of operational hours per year and the
transferred mass or volume to the application is provided in
theQRA. In one QRA, amultiplication factor of 2 has been used
for the failure frequency to represent a rupture on the side of
the HRS and the application. The preventive and mitigation
measures that have been applied to the failure scenarios of
the dispenser are non-return valves for simple HRS configu-
rations and excess flow valves and blocking components for
complex HRS configurations. Especially in the latter case, this
has a significant effect on the failure frequency applied to the
failure scenario in which the preventive and mitigation mea-
sure fails to intervene (1E-03 for the blocking components vs
6E-2 for the excess flow valve). In some QRAs, no preventive
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and mitigation measures have been considered. The excess
flow valve has been applied as a preventive and mitigation
measure in one occasion and rejected in the other based on
the argumentation that the maximum effect distances are
already reached before the excess flow valve is activated. The
amount of hydrogen that is released in the failure scenario is
often considered to be a part of or the total storage capacity of
the hydrogen buffer storage. It should be noted that the pre-
ventive and mitigation measures are not applied to the leak
scenario in the QRAs.
In conclusion, hydrogen dispensers have mainly been
considered in the QRA as hoses but occasionally as arms.
Several preventive and mitigation measures have been used
to limit the release of hydrogen but these differ in failure
frequencies and reaction time.
Hydrogen process piping
All HRSs include piping to connect the individual sub-systems
and components but not all QRAs include the piping as a
predefined component. When it is included, the failure sce-
narios provided in Section 4.3 are correctly applied and the
piping (length between 10 and 50m) is considered between the
compressor and the buffer storage and between the buffer
storage and the dispenser. As process piping is only sporadi-
cally considered in the QRAs, it is not clear under which
conditions process piping should be considered and if so,
where or betweenwhich sub-systems it should be considered.
Applications
Some of the QRAs include the applications (e.g. boat, bus, car)
that are expected to be refuelled at the HRS. These applica-
tions are then treated as a road tanker (application containing
fuel) or compartmented aboveground pressurised storage
system (storage system of the application). The applications
considered in the QRA contain at least 25 kg when completely
filled and as such it is claimed that the inclusion of the
application in the QRA is justified as it adds a significant
source of additional mass within the boundaries of the HRS
when being refuelled. However, the majority of the QRAs do
not include the applications. It is therefore not clear under
which conditions applications should be considered as part of
the QRA for HRSs.
Conclusions, recommendations and discussion
In this paper, the intercomparison of the QRAs of permitted
HRSs in the Netherlands has revealed significant in-
consistencies. These inconsistencies are found on various
aspects of the QRA and include the inclusion of HRS sub-
systems and components, the HRS sub-systems and compo-
nent consideration as predefined components, the application
of failure scenarios, the determination of failure frequencies,
the application of input parameters, the consideration of
preventive and mitigation measures as well as the informa-
tion provided regarding the HRS surroundings and the societal
risk.
It is therefore recommended to develop specific QRA
guidelines for HRSs to improve the consistency and coherence
of these QRAs for HRSs. Such guidelines could include:
o It should be clear for permitting authorities what the HRS
consists of and how it operates. A checklist of HRS sub-
systems and components and an extensive description of
sub-systems, components, preventive and mitigation
measures, configurations (including piping and instru-
mentation diagrams) and input parameters is recom-
mended. The HRS configurations shown in chapter 3, as
mentioned in PGS 35 or a P&ID can be taken as a starting
point, followed by a thorough description of each individ-
ual sub-system/component of the HRS, its operating pa-
rameters (mass, mass flow, mass contained, volume,
pressure, temperature) and the preventive and mitigation
measures applied. The intercomparison has revealed that
HRS sub-systems and components are sometimes not
included or even ex ante excluded without assessing the
risks associated to these components. This should be
avoided even if the time fraction is small.
o An explanatory note on how to consider predefined sub-
systems of the HRS and refuelling applications at the HRS
is necessary. The intercomparison revealed that some HRS
sub-systems that are regarded as predefined sub-systems
require further explanation on how to be considered in
the QRA. This is especially required for the hydrogen tube/
cylinder trailer (failure scenarios and frequencies for
compartmented pressurized sections, consideration of the
trailer hose, applied safety measures), compressor/booster
(sub-system boundaries), and the hydrogen buffer storage
(failure scenarios and frequencies for compartmented
aboveground pressurised tanks). It is recommended that
further guidance is provided under what conditions refu-
elling applications should be considered in the QRA.
o a harmonised approach for non-predefined and not-in-
scope HRS sub-systems/components is necessary: the
intercomparison has revealed that the reformer and elec-
trolyser are not or in part considered in the QRA. These
sub-systems consist of a several components and include
different gases or gas-mixtures so a dedicated approach is
required on how to consider these multi-component sub-
systems in the QRA. QRA literature (like [26,52,57]) provides
examples on how these sub-systems could be considered
from a QRA perspective. Exclusion of these sub-systems
from the QRA should be avoided as the risk associated
may not be negligible [26].
In addition to the predefined, conventional sub-systems,
HRSs may employ state-of-the-art sub-systems that do not
fit the scope of the predefined sub-system and would require
guidance or a dedicated approach. This may hold for the
compressor (membrane compressor), heat exchangers (cool-
ing block) and hydrogen buffer storage (composite type III or
type IV tubes or cylinders). Similarly, HRSs may employ
innovative sub-systems/components over state-of-the-art
sub-systems/components which may require guidance on
how to be considered (e.g. electrochemical or metal hydride
compressors).
Additionally, considering the inconsistencies observed in
the QRAs with the application of failure scenarios, the
adjustment approaches of failure frequencies, the presenta-
tion of risks and risk contributors and the inclusion of infor-
mation regarding the HRS surroundings, it could be
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recommended, besides applying more careful checks by
permitting authorities of the compliance of the QRA to the
prescribed approach, to establish a knowledge entity at na-
tional level that provides assistance to permitting authorities
in reviewing the QRAs of HRSs or provides an independent
review of the QRAs of HRSs. Such an entity could become a
centre of expertise that could collect existing and future QRAs
of HRSs to monitor the progress towards the consistent
application of the approach as well as provide guidance to
permitting authorities on how to apply the approach for HRSs.
This is justifiable considering the early stage andmunicipality
fragmented deployment of HRSs. In that view, it could be
considered to reinforce the second opinion service [69] that
RIVM is offering for permitting authorities dealing with QRAs.
Another option could be (and this is currently considered in
the Netherlands [70]), to apply,mandatory safety distances for
HRS configurations.
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